Archive for the ‘Subprime Mortgages’ Category



Subprime mortgage lenders specialize in offering financing to people with poor credit or riskier loans. Conventional lenders focus on low-risk loans and borrowers. While you will find better rates with conventional lenders, suprime companies offer more flexibility in requirements and loan terms.

Easier To Qualify For

Subprime mortgages are easier to qualify for than traditional loans. Since these lenders are willing to accept a higher level of risk, they offer a variety of packages. For example, someone with bad credit can still find a zero-down 30 year mortgage. You may also opt for a lower rate with an ARM or fixed-rate home loan.

For jumbo or unconventional loans, you may have to work with a subprime lender. Since these types of loans are harder to sell to the secondary market, some conventional lenders won’t handle them.

Higher Rates

For the increased level of risk, subprime lenders charge a higher rate, usually a couple points more than a conventional loan. You may also find more fees or points, especially if you want to waive early payment fees.

Conventional lenders offer the best rates and reasonable fees. However, there is a wide range in rates and fees between lenders.

No matter what type of financing you choose, request quotes from dozens of lenders. This protects you from scams and unscrupulous companies, while ensuring you get the best package. Finding a low rate is one of the easiest and biggest ways of saving yourself money.

No Worries Over PMI

Subprime lenders don’t require private mortgage insurance (PMI), unlike traditional lenders. PMI can add over a hundred dollars on your monthly payment.

It is required for conventional loans when the down payment is less than 20%. You can get around this requirement with conventional lenders by taking out two mortgages from separate companies. Another option is to put 20% down on your conventional loan, but take out a home equity loan after the deal closes to access your cash.

Just to make things more confusing, more and more conventional lenders are entering the subprime market. If you do need subprime financing, still request quotes from traditional lenders since you may still qualify.



As the US real estate market collapses, questions about subprime mortgages and those unable to pay are in the news. These are not inconsequential questions. Over $1.5 trillion of subprime–don’t ask, don’t tell–mortgages were issued and are now beginning to default.

As the defaults mount, the consequences will spread to countries and institutions far beyond the shores of the US and the desks of the originating lenders–for the majority of America’s subprime loans are owned by investors, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds in Europe and in Asia.

Why Would Anybody Do Such A Thing?

It retrospect, it wasn’t a good idea, to wit, to loan $1.5 trillion without asking applicants how much money they had or how much money they made. It seems improbable that bankers (remember those thin-lipped disapproving loan officers) would loan money under those conditions. But they did and this is why:

One year after the collapse of the US stock market in 2000, the NASDAQ dropped 80% and the US government feared a deflationary depression–a no money no demand depression like the 1930s–could happen.

So in 2001 the US government took quick and decisive action–in retrospect stupid and short-sighted–and flooded the US with money to prevent a depression from developing; but, in the process they created a real estate bubble and, as the bubble deflates, those who can’t pay their bills, aren’t.

Banks aren’t in business to loan money to those who can’t repay them and they knew that customers who “took advantage” of subprime mortgages were at high risk of default. So the banks sold their subprime loans.

Now, who would buy a “subprime”, e.g. substandard, loan? Who would buy a subprime steak, a subprime car, a subprime house, a subprime dating service? This is where the genius of Wall Street came into play.

To sell these soon-to-explode debt bombs, Wall Street cleverly bundled them with higher rated AAA debt and gave them a new name, CDOs, collateralized debt obligations, and sold trillions of dollars of 30% subprime but AAA rated CDOs to unsuspecting buyers.

Even if you don’t know what a CDO is, CDO sounds a lot better than subprime or substandard. That was the genius of Wall Street. It was a way for Wall Street to sell shaky debt before the fenders fell off. And it worked, at least for Wall Street.

These debt bombs are now embedded far across the global financial landscape, the majority bought by European and Asian investors and institutions seeking downstream revenues; but instead of downstream revenues, they will be absorbing unexpected and significant losses.

Fully 50% of the 2006 earning of HSBC, The Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, the world’s third largest bank, were wiped out by the subprime losses of its US subsidiary. AXA, a French insurance company and CommerzBank, a German Financial Services company were also major buyers of Wall Street’s subprime AAA rated debt and will suffer the consequences for so doing.

But it was not only European and Asian banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds and pension funds that will suffer, wealthy Japanese investors may suffer the greatest losses of all. It is believed that the highest-yielding but riskiest tranches (risk level) of the subprime CDOs were bought by wealthy individual Japanese investors.

The head of structured finance research at Nomura Securities, Mark Adelson, said these investors did not fully understand the risk they were taking, depending instead upon the ratings given by credit agencies such as Moody’s or the advice of those managing the security.

“A partial understanding of it is often no better than no understanding,” Adelson said. “The devil is in the details; if you understand it vaguely, you can get your lights punched out.”

Globalization has been a wealth builder, perhaps unequally so, but nonetheless wealth has been created. Soon, however, another darker side of globalization is about to manifest. Risk as well as money move quickly across global highways recently built and made possible by a one world financial marketplace, and that risk is now about to become apparent.

Global currency flows move swiftly and quickly and turn on a dime. The Asian liquidity crisis of 1997 was a recent manifestation of this phenomena; the next crisis will be the US. The subprime losses suffered by the buying of America’s bad debts may be the final straw in the diversion of foreign moneys away from America.

By selling foreign investors its bad debt, America has shot itself in the foot. Because America is now the world’s #1 debtor, because America needs over $1 trillion in foreign investment capital each year to pay its bills–and because it was foreign investors that were primarily burned by Wall Street’s subprime CDOs, the flow of foreign capital to the US may soon be going elsewhere.

In April 2007, a Merrill Lynch survey showed 38% of global money managers believed the best prospects for corporate profits were now in the eurozone, 42% believed the worst prospects were in the US.

Today, the word “de-couple” is increasingly heard where global markets are discussed. No longer referring to freight trains or dogs in delicto flagrante, de-coupling refers to the distancing, i.e. de-coupling, of global economies from the US, to wit, the increasingly perceived expeditious act or art of separating still-healthy economies from the slowing US economic engine.

While it is true the US has been the driver of the global economy, it is no longer. The sobriquet “has been” is literally correct in this instance. The US share of global economic growth so far in 2007 is 10%, a figure analogous to Barry Bonds batting .134.

Global capital flows, like tsunamis, are not something to be taken lightly. If the flow of foreign money to the US slows, the US dollar will collapse and the US will be forced to raise interest rates to continue attracting foreign capital. And, if US interest rates are raised, the US economy will collapse. Greenspan might call this a conundrum. Other people might call it and Greenspan something else.

Whose feet?

Whose fire?

America apparently cares little what happens to the primarily foreign investors and institutions who bought its subprime loans. On April 24th, Bloomberg reported the head of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Sheila Blair, testified before a congressional committee, “We should hold the servicers’ and the investors’ feet to the fire on this…We did not have good market discipline with investors buying all these mortgages.”

It is highly doubtful Ms. Blair will exhibit the same attitude should the flow of foreign moneys upon which Mr. and Ms. Average America depend go elsewhere. Thailand’s economy went into apoplectic shock and its currency and stock market fell by 50% in 1997 when international currency flows suddenly changed direction. America may soon be in for the same.

And if America falters and falls, the consequences of such will be felt around the world. Today, afternoon tea and scotch flow freely in The City as does dim sum in Hong Kong and Shanghai and sushi in Tokyo around their respective bourses. Soon, however, the risks that have lain dormant beneath globalization’s foundation are about to erupt and a reordering of the world’s financial geography is about to ensue.

It’s spring 2007 and the sun is shining in the US, backyard BBQs are being cleaned in anticipation of summer’s use. A severe financial crisis, however, is in the offing; a crisis as unexpected as the Golden State Warriors’ last minute streak to the NBA playoffs.

An unexpected financial crisis, however, will be much more consequential than Don Nelson’s magical resurrection of the Warriors’ NBA hopes. There, at least, the Warriors had a chance. But because most don’t know a financial crisis is coming, they will have little chance of survival. This summer, America’s subprime CDOs are coming home to roost, and not just to the US.



There are more than 19,000 mortgage companies in the U.S. and some of the largest and most reputable of them specialize in subprime mortgage refinancing.

Steven Frank, Senior Vice President of Marketing at FlexPoint Funding identifies a subprime borrower as “someone with a FICO score below 620. He or she will pay between 1.5% and 2% higher interest for a mortgage, but there is no shortage of money or willing lenders in the subprime mortgage market.”

What trends do you see in the subprime mortgage market for 2006 and beyond?

Steve: We went through the biggest refinancing boom in history from mid 2002 through September of 2005. As many as 80% of Americans refinanced their homes during that time. Interest rates on adjustable rate loans dropped to under 4% during the boom with some homeowners opting for fixed rates as low as 5%.

Now both fixed and adjustable are back around 6.5% and will probably reach 7% for an A-grade 30-year fixed mortgage and 9% for a subprime mortgage by the end of 2006. The rate of appreciation is a more normal 6% – 12% annually. A typical home in most parts of the country stays on the market about six months, which means it’s a balanced market favoring neither buyers nor sellers.

What type of mortgage would you recommend for subprime borrowers?

Steve: Most subprime borrowers won’t qualify for a second mortgage or a home equity line of credit. They will have to refinance their first mortgage if they want to cash out some of their equity. Depending on their personal situation, a homeowner may be able to borrow up to 95% LTV (loan to value). More likely, it will be in the 75%-85% range. There are very few 125% LTV mortgages anymore, and subprime borrowers won’t qualify for these.

Subprime borrowers should work with a company that understands their particular needs; one that sees more than their past problems and that specializes in flexible, affordable mortgage solutions.

Mortgage Refinancing Advice

Check your credit – According to the government loan agency, Freddie Mac, up to 15% of subprime borrowers have credit scores that qualify them for traditional loans. Don’t settle for subprime rates if you can get prime-rate mortgage refinancing.

Watch your costs – Interest rates won’t vary much among subprime mortgages, however, there are some aspects of the loan structure that will impact the bottom line, such as:

- length of the mortgage term; 10, 15 or 30 years

- if it is a fixed-rate loan or an adjustable-rate loan

- whether any points have to be paid ( a “point” equals one percent of the loan)

- what kind of processing fees and closing costs are required

Look for good customer service – A good lender will walk potential borrowers through the application process, verifying personal information and making sure all the terms of the loan are understood. The lender will also recommend whether to lock in an interest rate during the processing phase or let the rate float until the closing.

Get a free quote – Prospective borrowers looking for refinancing can take advantage of sites like Bad Credit Mortgage Refinancing Now [http://www.badcreditmortgagerefinancingnow.com].